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SHORT-TERM TRUST
should be punished, but the penalty should be substantive, and only
after a due process conviction at a separate trial for the escape. Some
procedural sanctions such as conditional dismissal of appeal may be
justifiable when the escapee is still at large, but never after recapture
when personal jurisdiction has reattached, especially if the appeal has
not been delayed.
The preclusion of review allowed by Estelle means that a prison
term must be served by the escapee regardless of errors in his original
conviction which, had an appeal been allowed, might have resulted in a
new trial or outright reversal. Apart from this borderline due process
consideration, there is a serious equal protection issue not fully faced by
the majority. As Justice Stewart indicates in his dissent,0 7 a real possi-
bility exists of two prisoners escaping at the same time and in the same
manner and yet suffering completely disparate sentences dependent
upon the fortuity of errors at trial, and wholly unrelated to the gravity of
the offense of escape. Although the majority in Estelle v. Dorrough
considered the interests of appellate courts in judicial economy, the
interests of other appellants in expeditious appeals, and the interests of
the state and the public in deterring escape, the most important
interest-that of an inmate under a quarter-century prison term in
having justice done-has been sadly neglected.
OTHO B. Ross, m
Federal Income Taxation-Transfers to and Leasebacks from a
Short-Term Trust
For almost thirty years' tax planners have been frustrated by the
judicial confusion surrounding the deductibility of rental payments
made by a settlor for property used in his trade or business which he has
transferred to and leased back from a short-term trust.2 To date, two
for duress due to homosexual threats. People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220
N.W.2d 212 (1974), noted in 43 U. Cun. L. REv. 956 (1974). The escapee in Estelle
apparently did not seek to justify his escape.
107. 420 U.S. at 542.
1. The first case to deal directly with this problem was Skemp v. Commissioner,
168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
2. Deductions of rental payments for property used in the taxpayer's trade or
business are generally allowed under section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. That section provides in part:
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somewhat divergent lines of decision have emerged.3 Those cases allow-
ing the deduction as an "ordinary and necessary" business expense have
focused on the leaseback and have found "necessity" in the settlor's legal
obligation to pay rent.4 As part of this analysis courts so holding have
emphasized the identity of an independent trustee who has the power
and fiduciary obligation to enforce payment of the rent. Those cases
denying the deduction have rejected this bifurcated approach and have
viewed the transfer and leaseback as single steps in one integrated
transaction. So viewed, it has been held that the transfer and leaseback is
often merely a method of allocating the settlor's income to the trust
beneficiaries and is void of business purpose. If the transaction as a
whole is void of business purpose, rent paid pursuant to the lease cannot
be a "necessary" expense.5 In Perry v. United States" the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit followed the decisions that deny
the deduction and held that the active independence, not the identity, of
the trustee is the controlling factor.7
(a) In General.-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business, including-
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of prop-
erty to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which
he has no equity.
Prior versions of section 162, applicable to some cases hereinafter discussed, are
comparable.
3. The line of demarcation between these two sets of cases has been described as
"thin." Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524, 529 (1965); see Oliver, Income Tax Aspects of
Gifts and Leasebacks of Business Property in Trust, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 21 (1965).
4. See, e.g., Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); C. James
Mathews, 61 T.C. 12 (1973); Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965); Albert T. Felix, 21
T.C. 794 (1954). In several cases the identity of the trustee has been a factor in denying
the deduction. See, e.g., Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965) (grantor was trustee); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398
(2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952) (grantors wife was trustee); Jack
Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974) (grantor was
trustee); Sidney W. Penn, 51 T.C. 144 (1968) (grantor was trustee); Irvine K. Furman,
45 T.C. 360 (1966), affd per curiam, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967) (grantor's wife was
trustee).
5. Perry v. United States, No. 74-1852 (4th Cir., July 29, 1975); see, e.g., Audano
v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970); cf. Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341
F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965). Compare Chace v. United
States, 303 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.
1970) with Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962). See also Jack
Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974); Sidney W. Penn,
51 T.C. 144 (1968); Irvine K. Furman, 45 T.C. 360 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 381 F.2d
22 (5th Cir. 1967).
6. No. 74-1852 (4th Cir., July 29, 1975).
7. Id. at 8.
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The taxpayers in Perry were two physicians practicing medicine in
a partnership located in Louisburg, North Carolina. In 1963 construc-
tion was completed on an office building on property they had acquired
as tenants in common. Since that time the building had been used solely
for their medical practice."
In 1968 each taxpayer established a Clifford trust9 for the benefit
of his minor children. Except for differences in beneficiaries and in
duration,' 0 the two trusts were identical and the same bank was named
as trustee. Broad administrative powers were granted to the corporate
trustee and remainders were reserved in the grantors. Each physician's
undivided interest in the office building was the sole asset of his trust.
Prior to the formal conveyance of the res into trust, a. leaseback of
the office building was arranged with the corporate trustee. This arrange-
ment covered all the terms of the lease," and the lease was executed
8. Dr. Medders, Dr. Perry's partner, filed a separate refund suit, No. 74-1853 (4th
Cir., July 29, 1975). In each case the taxpayer's wife was joined since each couple filed
joint tax returns for the year in question. The two cases were consolidated for trial. No.
74-1852 at 3.
9. The parties stipulated that the short-term trusts were valid under the "Clif-
ford" sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (sections 671 through 678). No. 74-
1852 at 3. These sections require that a qualifying trust have a minimum duration of ten
years, list certain powers that the grantor cannot retain, and prohibit the use of trust
income for the grantor's benefit. If a trust qualifies, the income therefrom is taxed to the
trust and not to the grantor. Thus, the Clifford trust coupled with a leaseback to the
grantor has been a popular means of intra-family income splitting among those taxpayers
whose wealth is tied up in business property. Oliver, supra note 3, at 22; Note, The Use
of Business Property as Short-Term Trust Corpus, 19 VAND. L. REv. 811 (1966). The
taxpayer who owns business property can maximize tax savings by transferring such
property to a short-term trust, retaining a reversion, and taking back a lease on the
property. If the trust qualifies under the Clifford sections the income from the property
is taxed to the trust, presumably at a lower rate. And, at least in 1957, the grantor-tenant
could be reasonably confident of getting a deduction for rentals paid to the trust under
section 162(a) (3) if the rent was reasonable and the trustee was an entity with which he
had no affiliation. John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956), acquiescing 1957-2 CuM. BULL.
6; Oliver, supra note 3, at 21.
Some commentators have argued that the tests for determining under the Clifford
sections to whom short-term trust income will be taxed should be used to determine the
deductibility of rentals paid to the trust under a leaseback situation. See Oliver, id. at 31;
Note, 19 VAND. L. REv., supra, at 822. While this may seem to be a logical approach it
has consistently been rejected by the courts. See, e.g., Perry v. United States, No. 74-
1852. This rejection is based on legislative history which specifically denies the applica-
bility of sections 671 through 678 to this situation and which has been expressly adopted
by the Treasury. Id. at 3 n.2, quoting S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1954);
Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1(c) (1956).
10. The Perry trust was to terminate ten years and one day from its establishment.
The Medders trust was to terminate in fourteen years. Each lease was for a term equal to
the life of the trust. Perry v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
11. Under the prearranged lease the trustee was required to pay all real property
taxes and to make all exterior repairs. He reserved the right to declare the lease
terminated upon the taxpayer's non-payment of rent. Each taxpayer agreed to pay his
one-half of all utility expenses, to make interior repairs, and to pay a monthly rent of
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contemporaneously with the conveyance into trust. For the taxable year
1969 the taxpayers deducted under section 162(a) (3) of the Internal
Revenue Code'2 the rental payments made to the trustee. These de-
ductions were not allowed and the taxpayers paid the additional tax.
Each brought a refund suit in federal district court.13 That court, while
acknowledging that there were two divergent views'14 concerning the
deductibility of such rental payments, felt that the Perry facts were
squarely within the line of cases allowing the deduction on the basis of
the existence of an independent, non-related trustee.' 5
On appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed. Rejecting the lower court's
analysis, the Fourth Circuit focused on the realities of the entire transac-
tion.' 6 It concluded that, under the Perry facts, even though the corpo-
rate trustee was an independent entity, he had no actual powers or du-
ties other than rent collection and disbursement to the beneficiaries.
The trust principal was irrevocably reserved to the grantor's possession
from the moment the trust was created.' 7 Thus there "was literally no
area in which the broad powers of management vested in the bank as
trustee could operate. Its 'independence' from the settlors was largely
iluusory .... ,,'8 The Fourth Circuit concluded that, when viewed in
its entirety,' there was no real business purpose to the transaction."
two hundred dollars. It was stipulated by the parties that this rental was reasonable.
Perry v. United States, No. 74-1852. For the importance of reasonable rent in determin-
ing deductibility under section 162(a)(3), see Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251,
259 (5th Cir. 1970); Oliver, supra note 3, at 35; Note, 19 VArN. L. REv., supra note 9,
at 819.
12. See note 2 supra.
13. Perry v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.C. 1974). See note 8 supra.
Cross motions for summary judgment were filed on the stipulated facts. From an adverse
judgment the government appealed.
14. In the district court the government had argued that the rental payments were
not deductible because the taxpayers had a reversion in the trust corpus. Thus, the
government contended, they had an "equity" in the property expressly forbidden by
section 162(a)(3). See note 2 supra. The district court rejected this argument, and this
ruling was not appealed. 376 F. Supp. at 19-20. For an analysis of this argument,
compare C. James Mathews, 61 T.C. 12 (1973) and Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524
(1965) with Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962) and Sidney W.
Penn, 51 T.C. 144 (1968).
15. 376 F. Supp. at 19.
16. Perry v. United States, No. 74-1852 at 9.
17. Id. at 7, quoting Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir.
1965).
18. No. 74-1852 at 8.
19. The Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the "bifurcated" business purpose test as
articulated in Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948). No. 74-1852 at 9.
See also Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965). Under the "bifurcated" approach the
transaction is viewed as it existed after the transfer into trust has been completed. Thus
the settlor's need for office space supplies the "business purpose" for his renting of the
building and, therefore, the rent should be deductible under section 162(a) (3).
20. It is well established that for an expenditure to be "necessary" within the
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Therefore, no expenses incident to elements of the transaction could
be "ordinary and necessary" business expenses deductible under sec-
tion 162.21
Before considering the import of the Perry decision, it is necessary
to examine briefly the two lines of transfer and leaseback cases that
preceded it. The Seventh Circuit was first to face the present problem in
the leading case of Skemp v. Commissioner.2 The taxpayer had estab
lished an irrevocable, twenty-year trust to which he conveyed the build-
ing that housed his medical offices. s3 Upon termination of the trust the
corpus was to be distributed to the beneficiaries by the corporate trustee.
Prior to the transfer the taxpayer had arranged to reserve the right to
rent all or part of the building from the trustee for a ten-year renewable
term. However, the rental amount was to be determined by the trustee.24
Under these facts the Seventh Circuit reversed a divided Tax Court25
and held that the rental payments made by the taxpayer to the trust were
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.2 6 in so holding,
the court of appeals emphasized that the existence of a corporate trustee
negated the Commissioner's contention that the taxpayer had "fixed"
the rental amount. The court reasoned that such a contention could be
valid only if the trustee had breached its fiduciary duty. 7 The Seventh
Circuit also rejected the Commissioner's "incomplete gift" argument
since the taxpayer had irrevocably conveyed the property while retaining
no reversion.2 8 Finally, the court was faced with the Commissioner's
meaning of section 162, there must have been a "business purpose' for making that
expenditure. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); see Treas. Reg. § 1.269-2(b)
(1962). What is at issue in the Perry case is at what point in the transaction that test is
to be applied.
21. No. 74-1852 at 9.
22. 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
23. Dr. Skemp used only part of his building. The remainder he rented to third
persons. Id. at 599.
24. The Tax Court appears to have assumed that the rent Dr. Skemp paid was
reasonable. A.A. Skemp, 8 T.C. 415, 422-23 (1947). See note 11 supra.
25. There were two dissenters in the Tax Court. Tyson, J., concurred in the opin-
ion of Black, J. Black's dissent, upon which the court of appeals looked with favor,
emphasized that the taxpayer had retained no reversion, had paid reasonable rent, and
was legally obligated by his lease from the corporate trustee, in arguing for the
deduction. A.A. Skemp, 8 T.C. 415, 422-23 (1947).
26. Skemp was decided under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(2) (1) (A), 53
Stat. 12 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (3)). See note 2 supra.
27. 168 F.2d at 599. There was no evidence of such a breach. Id.
28. Id. at 600. The "incomplete gift" argument asserted that since the grantor
retained dominion and control over the trust corpus, the gift was not completed. Thus if
complete ownership had not been transferred, rental payments made to the trust Were not
"necessary." Rev. Rul. 54-9, 1954-1 Cum. BuLL. 20, cited in, Note, 19 VAND. L REV.
supra note 9, at 814 & n.29.
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contention that the rental payments were not "necessary" since the
taxpayer had made a voluntary conveyance of this business property
and it was this conveyance that made the rentals necessary. This argu-
ment was implicitly rejected. The court found "necessity" under section
162 in the taxpayer's legal obligation to pay rent.29
Skemp has been sporadically followed since it was decided. It has
been cited as authority for purposes of determining the necessity of rent,
for viewing the transaction from the point in time after the transfer into
trust is made,"' for considering the identity of the trustee as "crucial,""'
"pivotal, '32 and "controlling"33 in determining his independence,84 and
for viewing the retention by the grantor of no reversion as indicative of
release of all control over the property.85
The leading decision in the line of cases which denies tie deduction
under similar facts is Van Zandt v. Commissioner.8 In that case the
taxpayer, a physician, conveyed to two Clifford trusts8" the office build-
ing in which he practiced and the equipment that it contained. The
trusts were irrevocable and were to last for just over ten years. The
taxpayer was trustee for both trusts. Contemporaneously with the con-
veyance the taxpayer, as trustee, leased the building and the equipment
back to himself, as an individual. The Commissioner disallowed the
deductions the taxpayer had claimed for the rent he had paid to himself
as trustee.
The Tax Court denied the deduction, 8 distinguishing Skemp since
in that case there was an independent trustee.39 The Tax Court noted
29. "While the taxpayer voluntarily created the situation which required the
payment of rent, the fact remains that the situation created did require the payments."
168 F.2d at 600. This approach, viewing the single element, the leaseback, to determine
necessity under section 162, is referred to as the "bifurcated" approach. See note 19
supra. E.g., No. 74-1852 at 9.
30. Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 1972); Brown v.
Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); C. James
Mathews, 61 T.C. 12, 18 (1973); Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524, 530 (1965).
31. C. James Mathews, 61 T.C. 12, 18 (1973).
32. Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1972).
33. Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
814 (1950).
34. See cases cited note 4 supra.
35. Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1972); Brown v.
Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); Alden B.
Oakes, 44 T.C. 524, 530 (1965); John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200, 213-14 (1956); Albert T.
Felix, 21 T.C. 794, 803-04 (1954).
36. 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
37. See note 9 supra.
38. .L. Van Zandt, 40 T.C. 824 (1963).
39. Id. at 830.
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that, when the overall effect of this transaction was considered, the result
was simply a shift in family income.40 Thus, since the taxpayer would
not have been required to pay rent before the transaction, and since the
transaction had no business purpose, the rents he paid were not "neces-
sary" under section 162.41
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. That court followed the Tax Courts
analysis and viewed the transaction as a series of integrated steps.42 So
viewed, the court of appeals could find no reason for the transfer and
leaseback other than an attempt to maximize tax savings. 4 '1 Skemp was
distinguished on its facts." Indeed, the Fifth Circuit thought its holding
in Van Zandt was not inconsistent with Skemp since the existence of
trust income other than the rents paid by Dr. Skemp could provide
management of the entire building as a valid business purpose.45 In
comparing the Van Zandt facts to those in Skemp, the court found the
prearranged leaseback, which included in its terms the amount of rent to
be paid, left the trustee with no active duties to perform in the interest of
the beneficiaries. Since the trustee in Van Zandt was also the grantor,
and since he had nothing to do but collect and disburse predetermined
income, the Seventh Circuit concluded that he could not be independ-
ent. Coupling this lack of independence with a lack of necessity, the
court concluded that the deductions were properly denied.
Van Zandt, like Skemp, has been widely followed.40 Recently the
Fifth Circuit reaffirmed several of its conclusions concerning transfers
and leasebacks first articulated in Van Zandt. In Audano v. United
States,47 upon very similar facts, the court noted that even if the rental
amount was reasonable, no deduction could be allowed if the obligation
to pay "was created solely for the purpose of effectively creating a
camouflaged assignment of income."4 s Such payments, the court con-
cluded, were not "necessary" within the meaning of section 162.19
In Perry the Fourth Circuit, faced with these conflicting prece-
dents, chose to follow the Van Zandt analysis.5 0 Using that approach,
40. Id.
41. Id. at 831.
42. 341 F.2d at 443.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 442.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., cases cited note 5 supra.
47. 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970).
48. Id. at 256-57.
49. In denying the deduction the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the trustee had
done nothing to protect the beneficiaries' interests. Id. at 258.
50. No. 74-1852 at 8.
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the court viewed the transfer and leaseback as integrated steps in a
single transaction.51 In order for the rent payments to be deductible
there had to have been a real business purpose for the initial transfer
into trust to make the subsequent rental payments "necessary."5 2 Under
the Perry facts no such purpose was found.58
There has been substantial controversy in the courts 4 and in the
literature55 concerning the point at which the business purpose test
should be applied in a transfer and leaseback situation. Some early
commentators56 vigorously argued in favor of the "bifurcated" approach
followed in Skemp. They reasoned that demanding a business purpose
for the transfer into trust was inappropriate, especially in intra-family
arrangements where a decision to create a trust for the benefit of the
natural objects of one's bounty is seldom made for business reasons.
Thus, they argued, the test proved "too rigorous. '5 7 On the other hand,
applying the test at the time of the leaseback appears to provide a
business purpose for all such transactions. In most cases there would be
business purpose in renting office space. Therefore, all such rental
payments would be "necessary."
Both of these positions are supported by caselaw. "8 In choosing the
Ilan Zandt approach, the Fourth Circuit relied on its customary view of
the overall effect of a transaction. 59 Though there appears to be funda-
mental logic to this view, the court offered no analysis or policy for its
choice. What is clear, however, from the Perry opinion, is that a transfer
into trust with a subsequent leaseback should pass muster under the
business purpose test as applied by the Fourth Circuit if (a) the trust
income consists of something more than the rents paid by the settlor,
and (b) the settlor has retained no reversion.60
The selection of the two factors that the Fourth Circuit described
in Perry as "indices of a transaction having a real business purpose
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 9. See note 20 supra.
53. No. 74-1852 at 8.
54. For cases applying the "bifurcated" analysis, see cases cited note 30 supra. For
cases supporting the single transaciton approach, see Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d
1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1972) (Ely, J., dissenting); cases cited note 5 supra.
55. E.g., Oliver, supra note 3, at 30, 31; Note, 19 VAND. L. RE v., supra note 9, at
818-19.
56. See note 55 supra.
57. Oliver, supra note 3, at 31.
58. Cases cited note 54 supra.
59. No. 74-1852 at 9. "In our circuit we customarily view a multistep transaction
by its overall effect and not simply by scrutiny of mutually dependent steps." Id.
60. Id. at 11.
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.,61 is consistent with prior law and with the court's analysis. In
distinguishing precedent cited by the taxpayer,62 the court noted that
while the taxpayer in Perry retained a reversion, in none of the cases
cited in support of the deduction was a reversion retained. Likewise, in
analyzing the district court's opinion in Perry, the Fourth Circuit im-
plied that the lower court did not realize that "a factor probably leading
to the result in Skemp. .."6 was that in that case the taxpayer retained
no reversion. While the use of this factor is supported by both lines of
decisions,64 the emphasis in Perry was unusual.
The other index of real business purpose cited by the court in Perry
is not so well established in the caselaw.65 Considering trust income
other than the rents paid by the taxpayer-settlor as providing business
purpose for the transfer stems from the Van Zandt court's distinction of
Skemp. 66 The Fifth Circuit considered its denial of the rental deduction
not inconsistent with the Skemp holding. 7 The court reasoned that real
business purpose for the transfer into trust could be found in the settlor's
desire to have a trustee manage the uncertain amount of income other
than the rentals he paid.68 The Fourth Circuit in Perry adopted this
conclusion. 9 Since in Perry the taxpayer held a reversion, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the trustee was administering the trust for the
ultimate benefit of the settlor. And since there was no trust income other
than the rentals paid by the settlor, the court concluded that the trustee
was merely a conduit through which the settlor could distribute his
income. 70
61. Id.
62. Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Commis-
sioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp v. Commis-
sioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
63. No. 74-1852 at 6.
64. In most cases allowing the deduction no reversion was retained. E.g., cases
cited note 62 supra. In most cases denying the deduction the retention of a reversion was
considered as a retention of control in analyzing business purpose. E.g., Audano v.
United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
65. Three cases hold that trust income other than the payments made by the settlor
should be a factor supporting business purpose: Perry v. United States, No. 74-1852; Van
Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965);
Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948). This argument was rejected in
Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), af'd mem., 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 814 (1965).
67. Id. at 444.
68. Id.
69. No. 74-1852 at 10.
70. Id.
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The taxpayer's failure in Perry to meet either of the two indices of
real business purpose previously discussed and his failure to show any
business purpose for the transfer into trust should have been sufficient to
defeat his claim for deductibility of the rentals.7" However, the Fourth
Circuit seized upon the opportunity presented in Perry to clear up some
confusion concerning whether the identity of the trustee or his actual
independence from the settlor is the proper inquiry when examining
control retained by the grantor.72 The taxpayer in Perry had argued that
the existence of an independent, corporate trustee placed him directly on
point with the Skemp facts. The Fifth Circuit in Van Zandt did seem to
emphasize that an important factor in denying the deduction was that
the settlor was also the trustee.73 This emphasis also seemed consistent
with the Skemp analysis in which the trustee's fiduciary duty was
considered to refute the Commissioner's argument that the settlor had
retained control.74 The Fourth Circuit, however, concluded that a care-
ful reading of the Van Zandt opinion invited the conclusion that the
actual independence, rather than the identity, of the trustee was the
proper inquiry. 75
The Perry court's conclusion is directly in line with substantial
precedent.7 While the identity of the trustee has been examined in
considering his independence, it is clear that this factor is not determina-
tive.77 Other factors bearing on the trustee's ability to actively protect the
beneficiaries' interest have been considered.78 Thus the conclusion com-
pelled by precedent and reached by the Fourth Circuit in Perry is that
regardless of the identity of the trustee, he must have actual indepen-
dence and active functions through which he can protect his benefi-
ciaries' interests. If he has such power, it can be fairly concluded that the
71. Regardless of who the trustee was, if the transaction had no business purpose,
the rents paid were not "necessary" under section 162. See note 20 supra; cf. C. James
Mathews, 61 T.C. 12, 18, 19 (1973).
72. No. 74-1852 at 7, 8.
73. Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.s. 814 (1965).
74. Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 599 (7th Cir. 1948).
75. No. 74-1852 at 7, 8.
76. E.g., Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970); C. James
Mathews, 61 T.C. 12 (1973); Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965).
77. E.g., Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
814 (1950) (grantor's attorney was trustee, rents held deductible); John T. Potter, 27
T.C. 200 (1956) (grantor's father, wife and accountant were trustees, rents held
deductible).
78. E.g., cases cited note 11 supra (reasonableness of rents); Hall v. United States,
208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962) (grantor's right to settle accounts with trustee); Jack
Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), affd mem., 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974) (no formal lease
and sporadic rental payments).
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grantor has not retained sufficient controls to be considered owner of the
corpus.
The real significance of the Perry decision lies in tie advice the
Fourth Circuit has given tax planners. While the transfer and leaseback
of business property to a Clifford trust remains a tax savings device, the
court will demand strict compliance with two requirements. First, the
Fourth Circuit will apply the business purpose test at the time of the
transfer into trust. The retention of no reversion by the settlor and the
existence of trust income other than the settlor's rental payments will be
considered factors showing real business purpose. Second, the court will
look past the identity of the trustee and will focus on his actual indepen-
dence, indicated by his ability to protect and further the beneficiaries'
interests, to determine whether the settlor has properly relinquished
control over the corpus. It is hoped that the Fourth Circuit's clear
articulation of the standards it will require in the transfer and leaseback
situation will provide needed predictability to those prospective grantors
who seek to avail themselves of this tax savings device.
CARL N. PATTERSON, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-The Abstention Doctrine as Amended by
Hicks v. Miranda: A Legal Definition and Ominous Omissions
The abstention doctrine1 is a judicial device designed to reduce the
tensions inherent in our dual system of government. The doctrine allows
federal courts to defer to state courts and thus to avoid unnecessary
confrontation when federal and state jurisdictions overlap. 2 Significant-
ly, the impact of abstention extends beyond the procedural level to affect
fundamental substantive rights.' Thus, in sensitive substantive areas,4
1. One commentator speaks of "abstention doctrines" since there are several
distinguishable lines of cases. C. Wmrr, HANDBOOK Op LAw OF FnDnJ4L CouRis § 52
(2d ed. 1970).
2. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941); Kurland,
Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24
F.R.D. 481, 487 (1959); Comment, The Abstention Doctrine: Some Recent Develop-
ments, 46 TuL. L. PIv. 762, 763 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); H. FRmNDLY,
FEDERAL JrmsDIcroN: A GENERAL Vinw 87-88 (1973); Maraist, Federal Intervention
in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger, and Beyond, 50 TExAS L REV.
1324, 1326-27 (1972).
4. Civil rights litigation is a particularly sensitive area in which courts have
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